BACKGROUND
The OIG's Complaint Analysis Center received a referral from our Aviation and Special Programs Audit office regarding the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate's (TAD's) oversight of Boeing aircraft certification. During the course of an on-going audit, our auditors received an allegation from TAD employees that TAD and FAA headquarters managers have not always supported TAD employee efforts to hold Boeing accountable. TAD employees also alleged that the failure to always hold Boeing accountable has created a "bad atmosphere" within the TAD. We reviewed the TAD employees' allegations and present our findings below.
The TAD, located in Seattle, Washington, is responsible for overseeing the development and manufacturing of large transport aircraft, including Boeing aircraft. FAA does not have the resources to oversee all development and manufacturing processes. Thus, per FAA's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, it has delegated some oversight functions to aircraft manufacturers. At Boeing, the ODA organization is the Regulatory Administration, formerly known as the Boeing Delegated Compliance Organization. The TAD's Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO) is responsible for overseeing the Regulatory Administration to ensure it complies with the requirements of the ODA program and safety regulations. Other offices within the TAD that also have operational contact with Boeing include the Aircraft Certification Offices (Seattle, Los Angeles, and Denver), Manufacturing Inspection Office (MIO) and Transport Standards Staff. REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE 3 c. TAD managers have not taken timely action to issue airworthiness directives for cargo and pre-1992 passenger aircraft that would require Boeing to address safety issues related to the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) wiring.
METHODOLOGY
d. FAA headquarters managers have not addressed TAD employee and FAA regional counsel concerns arising from implementation of the "changed product" rule.
2. As a result of TAD and FAA headquarters managers having not always supported TAD employee efforts to hold Boeing accountable, a negative work environment exists for TAD employees. TAD employees fear their managers will retaliate against them for attempting to hold Boeing accountable.
DETAILS
Allegation 1: TAD and FAA headquarters managers have not always supported TAD employee efforts to hold Boeing accountable.
FINDINGS
a. TAD managers have not, as required by FAA guidance, documented Boeing appeals of decisions made by TAD staff to TAD or FAA headquarters managers. As a result, TAD employees believe there is a lack of transparency in decisions made by their managers.
FAA Aviation Safety's (AVS's) Quality Management System (QPM Number AVS-001-013) requires offices within AVS to establish a "Consistency and Standardization Initiative" (CSI) process. The CSI process provides a way for stakeholders to appeal or request reconsideration of an aviation safety decision made by an AVS office in performing their regulatory and policy responsibilities. The goal of the CSI process is to:
(1) document aviation safety decisions, (2) promote early resolution of disagreements, and (3) promote consistency and fairness in applying FAA regulations and policies.
Aircraft Certification Service's (AIR) guidance for the CSI is contained in its Quality Management System work instructions (QPM AIR-001-013). AIR guidance requires:
(1) stakeholder appeals be tracked through an electronic workflow system, (2) appeals "must" start at the office level from which the stakeholder received the FAA position, and (3) may not go to another office (e.g. the Director's) to initiate an appeal. The process provides a means for tracking and documenting each side of the issue at each level of review, from the field office level up to AVS at FAA headquarters. AIR requires the use of the CSI module to document its appeals.
TAD employees alleged that when Boeing appeals a TAD technical specialist's decision, the appeal goes directly to TAD management or FAA headquarters and is not, as 
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required, documented in the CSI module. We were provided two examples of appeals not being documented, including one where a staff decision was appealed to senior AIR officials in FAA headquarters. We found that neither appeal was recorded in AIR's automated CSI module. TAD employees indicated that there were numerous such appeals; however, since FY 2008, only two have been recorded in AIR's CSI module. Because these appeals are not documented in the CSI system, TAD employees believe there is a lack of transparency in decisions made by FAA management.
b. TAD management overturned its staff's recommendation to remove Boeing's ODA and has not adequately addressed employees concerns regarding potential ODA conflict of interests. As a result, TAD employees view this as evidence of TAD management having too close a relationship with Boeing officials.
First, by March 2010, TAD employees had submitted five negative supervision reports against Boeing's including one report indicating falsely documented that a unit member left voluntarily (instead of for a "lack of integrity.") At that time, the BASOO planned to issue a letter to the ODA requesting corrective action in response to the five negative supervisor reports, but the letter was never sent. By March 2011, another five negative supervisions records were filed against the , primarily related to inability to effectively advocate FAA's position.
After consulting with AIR's Delegation and Airworthiness Programs Branch, the BASOO staff drafted a letter recommending the be removed from appointed position. Over TAD employee objections, however, the BASOO rejected the staff's removal recommendation and, in April 2011, requested the ODA take other corrective action. Internal records (created one month later) indicate the reason for the change in action was the need for "due process," i.e., no formal notice of the proposed removal was sent to the . In addition, the removal had not been first discussed with the .
In July 2011, the ODA responded to the BASOO indicating only that the had coached the , but did not address the BASOO's instructions to initiate a corrective action plan. Nonetheless, because the TAD manager did not believe the Boeing ODA's response to the BASOO's request for corrective action was adequate, in August 2011, he directed the BASOO manager to request the ODA to remove the from appointed position. In the ODA's response to the BASOO expressed disappointment in the decision given, said, July 2011 letter proposing corrective action was "reviewed by BASOO management prior to its submission." Despite the TAD management's ultimate decision to remove the , TAD staff contend the original rejection of their recommendation to remove the and the consultation with the BASOO prior to presenting the ODA's proposed corrective action is evidence of a relationship between FAA and Boeing that is "too close." Second, TAD employees expressed concerns regarding a recent re-organization that merged Boeing's Certification Office with the ODA. In particular, TAD employees did not believe employees from the former Boeing Certification Office, given their previous role was to deliver airplanes, would effectively advocate FAA's position. In particular, employees were concerned that former Certification Office employees (who are now in the ODA) and the ODA Lead Administrator may have "delivery of airplanes" as part of their performance standards, which may conflict with advocating FAA's position. TAD employees assert that such performance measures violate FAA Order 8100 paragraph 3-4b(3), which states: "An ODA unit member must have no conflicting restraints while performing authorized functions. Additionally, an ODA unit member must not have responsibilities that conflict with those of the ODA unit."
In an attempt to address this issue (along with other re-organization questions), BASOO management wrote to Boeing asking what performance measures are in place for individuals in key leadership positions. Boeing, however, did not specifically answer the question. And, BASOO management did not follow-up to verify if former Certification Office employees or the ODA have delivery of airplanes in their performance standards.
c. TAD has not taken timely action to issue airworthiness directives for cargo and pre-1992 passenger aircraft that would require Boeing to address safety issues related to the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) wiring.
In 2008, FAA issued the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule. To prevent electrical energy from entering the fuel tank via the FQIS wiring, this rule requires aircraft operators and manufacturers to install, by 2017, a flammability reduction means (FRM) retrofit into passenger aircraft manufactured after January 1, 1992. (This unsafe condition was identified during Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 safety reviews.)
The rule excludes all-cargo and pre-1992 passenger aircraft because they did not meet cost/benefit requirements and, since the average life of a passenger jet is 25 years, would likely not be in service by 2017. FAA recognized that separate airworthiness actions would need to be initiated to address these aircraft.
TAD employees alleged that TAD management was not holding Boeing accountable for providing service information to address this unsafe condition for aircraft excluded from the FTFR rule. Specifically, in August 2009, the TAD requested Boeing develop design changes and provide service instructions to support the TAD's issuance of airworthiness directives to correct the unsafe condition for aircraft not covered by the FTFR rule. Boeing refused to provide the service information and instead proposed applying the FRM retrofit to these aircraft. FRM retrofitting, however, is not required until 2017 and is more expensive than other methods such as a transient suppression device. And, U.S. Department of Transportation-Office of Inspector General FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552, Freedom of Information Act) (b)(6), (b)(7)c
according to FAA legal counsel, FAA cannot require Boeing provide the servtce information until it issues an airworthiness directive.
On March 1, 2012, about 2Y2 years after first requesting service instructions from Boeing, FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for an airworthiness directive on the Boeing 757 to address the FQIS issue. Because FAA took 2Y2 years to issue the NPRM for one aircraft and has not yet addressed other aircraft models, TAD employees believe that TAD management has not held Boeing accountable. d. FAA headquarters personnel have not addressed TAD employee and FAA regional counsel concerns arising from implementation of the "changed product" rule.
FAR 21.97, "Approval of Major Changes to Type Designs," the "changed product" rule, governs the certification of aircraft with major changes to specific areas that use a previously approved aircraft "type design" as the baseline. The April 2011 changes to FAR 21.97 added language that require the applicant to "show that the changed product complies with the applicable requirement" (i.e., FAR Part 25 airworthiness standards) and that the applicant provide a statement certifying the applicant has complied with these requirements. FAR 21.20, "Compliance with Applicable Requirements," also requires the applicant provide a "statement certifying that the applicant has complied with applicable requirements." With this new certification statement requirement, FAA can hold an applicant accountable for submitting a false certification by subjecting the applicant to enforcement action.
TAD and FAA regional counsel employees identified four concerns related to Boeing compliance with FARs 21.97 and 21.20. They view the lack of FAA and TAD action to timely address these issues as other examples of not holding Boeing accountable.
Concern 1: FAA headquarters has not initiated formal rulemaking to make clear that the intent of FAR 21.97 is to require only that "changes" to aircraft certified under this rule meet current airworthiness standards, not the entire aircraft.
According to FAA deputy regional counsel, as currently written, However, Aircraft Engineering Division (AIR-100) officials indicated that the intent of FAR 21.97 is that only those areas of the aircraft affected by a major change must meet 
current airworthiness standards as allowed by FAR 21.101. (FAR 21.101(b) (2) allows those areas not affected by the change to meet airworthiness standards in effect at the time the original aircraft basis was certified.) In August 2011, FAA issued an Advisory Circular to clarify the intent of FAR 21.97 and indicated it plans to issue a rulemaking to formalize the intent as described by AIR-100 officials. However, as December 2011, FAA had not initiated the formal rulemaking process.
Concern 2: FAA headquarters has not required Boeing to correct non-compliant designs that do not result in an unsafe condition and has not tracked the impact of these noncompliances. These failures may expose FAA to liability if it was determined they contributed to an accident.
At the time of our investigation, Boeing and FAA ODA procedures did not require noncompliant designs, which do not result in an unsafe condition, to be corrected. Prior to the establishment of the Boeing ODA, the TAD had a procedure referred to as the ACE chart (Aircraft Certification-Eligibility) that required the applicant to correct all noncompliances. If the non-compliant design was not an unsafe condition, TAD allowed an applicant to come into compliance within a reasonable period of time so as to not disrupt aircraft production.
As Boeing developed its ODA procedures manual, however, it did not include the ACE procedures. Instead, its procedures indicate that correction of a non-compliance that does not result in unsafe conditions is "voluntary." Boeing believes that correction of a noncompliance is voluntary because FAA Order 8100.15 (Organization Designation Authorization Procedures) does not explicitly require correction. A note to Paragraph 5-6.b.
(2) states:
The FAA uses the [airworthiness directive] process to mandate product changes or repairs for unsafe conditions. If a non-compliant condition in a product does not result in an unsafe condition, the OMT may ask the organization to correct the condition. The OMT must document when the ODA holder does not take corrective action for noncompliant conditions. The OMT will consider this when assessing the ODA holder's performance.
In fact, Boeing jncluded this note in its ODA procedures manual. We believe, as was suggested by the regional counsel staff, that the original intent of the note was meant to address aircraft already in operation (which would require an AD to correct) and not the aircraft's design.
FAA headquarters personnel did not support the TAD staff's attempts to require the ODA procedures be changed so that all non-compliances are corrected. Further, according to TAD staff, no one has assessed the cumulative effect that the uncorrected nonompliances might have on safety; and, according to staff, FAA may be exposed to liability if an accident is attributed to the non-compliances. Further, as U.S. Department of Transportation-Office of Inspector General FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552, Freedom of Information Act) (b)(6), (b)(7)c REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE required by FAR 21.97 and 21.101, the applicant must provide a statement certifying it has complied with applicable standards. If these non-compliances are not corrected in the design, Boeing would not be able to make this certification.
Concern 3: For aircraft certified under FAR 21.97, FAA headquarters has not required Boeing to provide a statement certifying that the entire aircraft meets airworthiness standards. Instead, Boeing certifies only that the changes meet current standards.
At the time of our review, Boeing certified only that the project meets airworthiness standards, i.e., that only the change(s) meet current standards. When TAD staff asked AIR-100 if Boeing acted appropriately, they replied that Boeing met the intent of FAR 21.97. However, according to FAA , Boeing's certifications do not comply with FAR 21.20, which applies to the entire product. Therefore, Boeing should also certify that those parts of the aircraft not affected by the changes meet airworthiness standards in effect at the time of original certification.
Concern 4: Contrary to the intent of FAR 21.20, Boeing has made its statement of compliance after the ODA (on FAA's behalf) has completed its review and approval of the certification package.
Under the Boeing Process Instructions (BPI-7716) for "Completing a BCA Regulatory Administration Certification Phase and Project," the statement of compliance is not prepared until after the ODA representatives have reviewed and approved all certification deliverables and the project is ready for type certification or project completion, i.e. the ODA has found the certification package compliant. According to the final rule comments (74 FR 53378, para. 8), this "rule is intended to expedite the type certification approval process by ensuring that an applicant's submission package is complete prior to the FAA making the compliance determination." In addition, according to the proposed rule (71 FR 58922), this "proposal would allow the FAA to exercise greater discretion in prio.ritizing its review of applications, to more effectively assign resources supporting the application process, and to select which aspects of an application to review more closely." TAD employees believe that, if FAA or its designees have already done the compliance work, FAA's opportunities to use its discretionary authority may be limited. Allegation 2: As a result of TAD and FAA headquarters managers having not always supported TAD employee efforts to hold Boeing accountable, a negative work environment exists for TAD employees. 
Transport Standards Staff. When asked to rate the working environment of the TAD as a whole on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 -very good/positive atmosphere and 5 -very bad/negative atmosphere), 57 percent (8) rated it greater than 3, i.e., on the negative side of the scale.
When asked about retaliation (e.g., lost job opportunities, lowered performance appraisals) for attempting to hold Boeing accountable, 60 percent (9) of TAD employees were fearful of it, almost half indicated that they had experienced it, and 47 percent (7) indicated they know of others who had experienced retaliation. For example, one interviewee said was retaliated against after submitted a report on , and
Finally, because of the fear of retaliation, 47 percent (7) 
